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Qais al-Khazali
Founder, leader
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On December 13, 2016, the United Nations implicated AAH’s Syrian wing, known as Harakat al-Nujaba, in the slaughter of dozens of civilians in Aleppo. Although supposedly operating independently of AAH in Iraq, Harakat al-Nujaba is comprised primarily of AAH fighters and those from fellow Iranian-backed militia KH.
Iraq’s Shiite militias are referred to as Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). In a July report, Human Rights Watch documented killings, disappearances, torture, and the destruction of homes by PMF groups during the fight to retake Fallujah and other Sunni-dominated areas in Iraq from ISIS.
Nevertheless, the Shiite militias were formally recognized by the Iraqi Parliament in November 2016.
Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) is an Iranian-backed Shiite militia and political party operating primarily in Iraq, as well as in Syria and Lebanon.* The group is implicated in numerous acts of sectarian violence and potential war crimes in Iraq and Syria.* On December 13, 2016, the United Nations implicated AAH’s offshoot in Aleppo, Harakat al-Nujaba, in the slaughtering of 82 civilians.* Though operating as an independent entity from AAH in Iraq, Harakat al-Nujaba is comprised primarily of former AAH fighters and some fighters from fellow Iranian-backed militia Katai’b Hezbollah.*Formed in 2006 by Qais al-Khazali, AAH has approximately 10,000 members and is one of the most powerful Shiite militias in Iraq.* Until the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, AAH launched more than 6,000 attacks on American and Iraqi forces, including highly sophisticated operations and targeted kidnappings of Westerners.* The group seeks to promote Iran’s political and religious influence in Iraq, maintain Shiite control over Iraq, and oust any remaining Western vestiges from the country.*
AAH broke away from the Mahdi Army (JAM), the militia run by influential Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, in 2006.* In August 2007, the U.S. designated AAH a “Special Group,” a label given to Iranian-backed Shiite militias operating in Iraq.* AAH is still one of three prominent Iraqi Shiite militias funded and trained by Iran’s external military wing, the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). AAH overtly displays its loyalty to Iran’s leaders, including the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and his predecessor, the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.* In Iraq, and reportedly in Syria as well, the group operates under the command of Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani.*
Following the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, AAH announced its intention to lay down its weapons and enter Iraqi politics.* The group opened a number of political offices and religious schools and offered social services to widows and orphans.* According to a Reuters report, “The model [AAH] uses is Hezbollah in Lebanon,” another Iranian proxy.*
The Shiite-led Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki reportedly welcomed AAH into politics,* noting that Khazali had “committed no crime under Iraqi law” and was therefore “welcome to play a role in public life.”* According to analyst Sam Wyer, AAH “expanded at an unprecedented and alarming rate.”* The group formed the political bloc al-Sadiqun (the Honest Ones) and ran under al-Maliki’s State of Law bloc in the April 2014 Iraqi national elections, winning one seat.*
Since entering politics, AAH has not fulfilled its vow to halt armed resistance, instead continuing to carry out sectarian violence,* execute homophobic attacks,* and threaten the “interests” of Western countries participating in strikes in Syria.* One of AAH’s Syrian offshoots—the IRGC-backed Harakat al Nujaba militia—is reportedly the largest Iraqi militia operating in Aleppo, where reports of war crimes against Sunni civilians are widespread. Another AAH offshoot, Imam Ali Brigades, dispatched forces to both Aleppo and Palmyra in 2016.* AAH forces are themselves reported to maintain unofficial units in Syria under the direct control of Qasem Soleimani.*
AAH is one of the leading militias in Iraq’s anti-ISIS volunteer forces, Haashid Shaabi (also known as the Popular Mobilization Forces or PMF).* Despite reports of sectarian atrocities and war crimes, AAH and other PMF militias (including the Badr Organization and the U.S.-designated Kata’ib Hezbollah) were formally recognized by Iraqi Parliament in November 2016.*
Doctrine:
AAH is a religiously motivated group with allegiance to Iran. The group is demonstrably anti-American and sectarian in its ideology.
AAH seeks to establish an Islamist, Shiite-controlled Iraq and promote Iranian objectives.* While AAH has origins within the Iraqi Sadrist movement, the group is openly loyal to Iranian leaders, most notably the Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei. Similarly, AAH shows deference to the Guardianship of the Jurists (velayat-e faqih), a judicial system that serves as one of the cornerstones of Iran’s Islamic Revolution system.* Writing for the Institute for the Study of War, analyst Sam Wyer characterizes AAH as a Khomeinist organization that aims “to create a suitable environment for the return of Imam Mahdi through the imposition of strict Shi’a Islamic governance.”* Wyer’s assessment is corroborated by Guardian Middle East correspondent Martin Chulov, who writes that AAH is a “proxy arm of the Revolutionary Guards’ al-Quds Brigades, whose main brief is to export Iran’s 30-year-old Islamic Revolution.”* AAH is also ideologically aligned with Iranian proxy Hezbollah, a Shiite Lebanese terrorist group.*
AAH is also virulently anti-American, a stance that has not abated since the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011. In March 2015, for example AAH boycotted the Haashid Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces) attack against ISIS in Tikrit because AAH rejected U.S. airpower support.* By the end of the month, AAH only agreed to rejoin the battle after Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi promised that the U.S. would stop its airstrikes.* AAH Spokesman Naim al-Aboudi said that the prime minister “realized this battle can’t be finished” without AAH and other militias,* demonstrating AAH’s continued prioritizing of its anti-American position above its other goals.
As a Shiite, Iranian-backed group, AAH also follows and implements a sectarian ideology that has deepened the fault lines between Sunnis and Shiites. According to Martin Chulov, AAH leader Qais al-Khazali’s speeches have galvanized “thousands” of Iraqi Shiites to fight for Assad’s regime in Syria, worrying many Iraqi communities about “a sectarian conflict that increasingly respects no border.”* In August 2012, AAH militants reportedly bombed the Sunni Sabatayn Mosque in Iraq, an attack that stirred a new wave of sectarian tensions in the country.* Since then, Human Rights Watch has documented numerous AAH attacks on Sunnis in Iraq in which AAH militants target Sunni mosques or towns.*
In line with this sectarian strife, AAH members have reportedly appropriated the derogatory term rafidah (a pejorative meaning “rejecters” that some Sunnis use for Shiites) as a badge of honor and “self-identity.” A January 2014 Foreign Policy piece reported that on an AAH linked-webpage, AAH proudly identified its fighters as rafidah “as a sign of mocking defiance against their foes.”*
Organizational Structure:
AAH is led by its founder, Qais al-Khazali, who broke off from the Mahdi Army (a.k.a. Jaysh al-Mahdi or JAM), a Sadrist militia, in 2006. According to a 2012 report by analyst Sam Wyer, Khazali sits on AAH’s five-person board of trustees along with two deputies. As an Iranian proxy, AAH coordinates with senior Iranian commanders, notably IRGC-Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani.*
AAH first began as a military unit within JAM. With the 2003 Iraq War, AAH reorganized into battalions assigned to four sectors: Baghdad, Maysan, Najaf, and Samarra. When Khazali made AAH an independent group in 2006, he retained this structure. AAH’s military arrangement is thought to be based on fellow Shiite militant group Hezbollah, with which the group has close ties.*
Since the U.S. withdrew its forces from Iraq in December 2011, AAH has expanded significantly into politics, “opening a string of political offices” throughout Iraq, according to the Washington Post.* AAH runs two political offices in Baghdad, and others in the Iraqi cities of Basra, Najaf, Hillah, al-Kalis, and Tal Afar. AAH has also sent political representatives to the southern Iraqi provinces of Dhi Qar, al-Muthanna, and Maysan to meet with tribal and minority leaders. The group’s political bloc is called al-Sadiqun (the Honest Ones), and in the April 30, 2014, parliamentary elections, AAH ran in alliance with Prime Minister Maliki’s Dawlat al-Qanoon (State of Law).* Outside Iraq, AAH has maintained political representation in Beirut, Lebanon since early 2011.* Despite reports of sectarian atrocities and war crimes, AAH and other PMF militias (including the Badr Organization and the U.S.-designated Kata’ib Hezbollah) were formally recognized by Iraqi Parliament in November 2016.*
In addition to operating in Iraq, AAH militants have also reportedly operated in Syria under the command of IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani.* The group’s Syrian offshoot—IRGC-backed Harakat al Nujaba militia—is the largest Iraqi militia operating in Aleppo, dispatching an estimated 3,000-4,000 fighters to Alepp.* Another AAH offshoot, Imam Ali Brigades, dispatched forces to both Aleppo and Palmyra in 2016.*
Financing:
AAH has received training, arms, and financial support from Iran, particularly through Iran’s external military branch, the IRGC-Quds Force, as well as from Iran’s Lebanese proxy Hezbollah.* Col. Rick Welch, a retired U.S. Army intelligence officer, said that during the 2007 U.S. surge in Iraq, Iran was giving AAH “$20 million a month or some outrageous figure like that” in order to train AAH fighters.* After U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq in December 2011, the financial pipeline from Iran continued. As of 2012, Iran was giving AAH $5 million in cash and weapons per month, according to an Iraqi close to the group. As of March 2014, the group was receiving an estimated $1.5 million to $2 million a month from Iran.*
Recruitment:
AAH recruitment focuses on two strategies: traditional propaganda efforts to raise the group’s profile, and a comprehensive religious system aimed to indoctrinate and recruit members. AAH has also emulated groups like ISIS by using social media to expand recruitment throughout the Middle East, South Asia, and the West.* The group also owns and operates Iraqi TV channel al-Aahd.*
One of the main ways AAH draws recruits is by advertising itself as a protector of the Shiite community within Iraq and abroad. AAH uses posters and issues calls for recruits on Iraqi television stations, often emphasizing its connection with Iran and Hezbollah.* One AAH member said that he was drawn to AAH because it was “protecting the Shiite community inside Iraq and abroad as well.”* In the past, the most important galvanizing point for Iraqis to join AAH and go to Syria to fight alongside Assad forces was the defense of the Sayeda Zenab shrine, a Shiite holy site in a Damascus suburb.*
AAH has seized homes and offices in Baghdad in order to establish recruiting centers where would-be volunteers could go to join other Shiites fighting in Syria.* In southern Iraq, posters urge men to join the fight in Syria with other Iraqi Shiites and provide a hotline number to call.* In August 2012, AAH distributed over 20,000 posters with AAH’s logo; a photograph of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; and a photograph of the late Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr. The posters were plastered on buildings and billboards and also used in street demonstrations.*
AAH’s second, but perhaps most comprehensive, recruitment strategy is a religious activism and education system. The group uses two mosques in particular, the Sabatayn mosque in Baghdad and the Abdullah al-Radiya mosque in al-Khalis, as hubs for recruitment. *AAH leaders give sermons at these mosques, advocating social and religious reform in Iraq in an attempt to entice attendees into joining, financing, or otherwise contributing to AAH’s mission.*
AAH has expanded its reach through a network of religious schools known as the “Seal of the Apostles.” These schools, spread throughout Iraq, serve as propaganda and recruitment facilities for the group. As with its military and political structures, AAH also appears to be emulating Hezbollah by launching social services programs for widows and orphans.* AAH’s recruitment efforts are funded in large part by Iran.*
Training:
Iran’s IRGC–Quds Force trains AAH in addition to funding and arming the group.* AAH’s training program reportedly resembles that of Iran’s Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah.* As of March 2014, AAH was receiving an estimated $1.5 million - $2 million from Iran a month.* U.S. Colonel Rick Welch said that during the 2007 U.S. surge in Iraq, Iran was giving AAH “$20 million a month or some outrageous figure like that” in order to train its fighters.*
In the past, AAH militants have received training from Lebanese Hezbollah operative Ali Mussa Daqduq.* The Quds Force placed Daqduq in charge of overseeing training for Iraqi Shiite militants in the region, including AAH fighters. From 2005 to 2007, Daqduq was particularly instrumental in recruiting and training AAH fighters.*
In June 2014, following calls for volunteer fighters from the Iraqi government and Iraq’s highest Shiite religious authority, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, there was a surge in Shiite volunteers to join the fight against ISIS.* Many found their way through AAH recruiting centers in Iraq.* According to an Iraqi source from 2014, AAH recruits aiming to join Assad forces in Syria are sent to Iran for approximately two weeks of training before going off to fight.
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